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Given a partial order P defined on a finite set X, a binary relation >p may be 
defined on X by setting x >p y  for elements x and y  in X just when more linear 
extensions L of P on X have xLy than yLx. A linear extension L of P on X is a 
linear order on X with P C L. There exist partial orders P such that >p includes 
cycles. Thus, in a voting situation in which voters are unanimous in their pre- 
ferences on the pairs in P and express all possible linearly ordered preferences 
on X which are consistent with P, with no two voters having the same preference 
order, strict simple majorities as given by >p can cycle. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate an unusual property of some 
finite partial orders. 
Given a partial order P (asymmetric, transitive) on a nonempty finite 
set 1, let 9’ be the set of all linear orders (asymmetric, transitive, and 
complete) on X which include P, and define the asymmetric binary relation 
>p onxby 
x>,y ifandonlyifS(x,y) >S(y,x), 
where S(x, y) is the number of linear orders L in 9’ which have xLy, or 
(x, y) E L. Clearly, S(X, y) + S( y, x) = I B I if x # y, and, as shown by 
Szpilrajn [3], S(x, y) = 1 B 1 iff xPy. Moreover, P C >p . 
One can think of x >P y as indicating that x “beats” y in the sense that 
more linear extensions of P have x over y than y over x. Alternatively, 
x >P y iff x has a strict simple majority over y in the family of linear 
extensions of P. In terms of a voting situation where X is a set of candi- 
dates, >P denotes the strict simple majority relation on X when each 
voter has a linear preference order on X which includes P, every such linear 
order is held by some voter, and no two voters have the same preference 
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order. In this interpretation, P is the intersection of the voters’ preference 
orders with xPy if and only if x is unanimously preferred to y. 
Our purpose here is to show that there exist partial orders P for which 
>P is not a partial order. In particular, we shall present a P on an X with 
31 points for which >P includes a cycle of the form {x >P y, y >P z, 
z >P x}. I have been unable to construct a >P cycle with smaller values of 
j X / and it is open as to how large I X 1 must be to obtain a >P cycle. 
The possibility of >P cycles in some partial orders is related to 
Condorcet’s well-known cyclical majorities phenomenon and to other 
voting aggregation anomalies discussed elsewhere [ 1, 21. The simplest case 
of cyclical majorities arises with three candidates x, y and z and three 
voters who have preference orders xyz (x preferred to y preferred to z), 
zxy, and yzx. Then, with >, denoting strict simple majority, x >, y, 
y >, z, and z >, x. This example does not of course demonstrate a >P 
cycle since (xyz, zxy, yzx> is not equal to the family of linear extensions 
of any partial order on {x, y, z}. 
2. EXAMPLE 
Let I be the symmetric complement of P so that xly iff neither xPy nor 
yPx. To obtain a cycle {x >P y, y >P z, z >P x}, it is necessary to have 
x1y, ylz, and z1x. A Hasse diagram for a partial order with this property 
FIGURE 1. 
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is shown in Fig. 1. There are k points above y and j + h points below y 
so that k + j + h + 4 points are used in the figure. We shall refer to the 
linearly ordered subset of k + j + h + 1 points which contains y as the 
principal chain. 
To form the linear extensions of P in Fig. 1, we first place z anywhere 
between a and b in the principal chain. This can be done in k + j different 
ways. Point t is then added to the augmented principal chain anywhere 
above z. Without x, the number of linear orders including z and t as thus 
placedequals2+3+~~~+(k+j+1)=(k+j+l)(k+j+2)/2-l. 
For each of these, x can be placed in any one of k + j + h + 3 ways 
above c so that 
I 9 / = [(k + j + l)(k + j + 2)/z - II@ + j + h + 3) 
= (k +j)(k + j + 3)(k + j + h + 3)/z. 
For each linear order extension with x omitted, (i) if z is above y, then x 
can be placed in k + 3 ways above y; (ii) if t is above y but z is below y, 
then x can be placed in k + 2 ways above y; and (iii) if both t and z are 
below y, then x can be placed in k + 1 ways above y. It then follows that 
S(x,~)=(k+3)(2+3+...+(k+l))+(k+2)(j)(k+l)+(k+l) 
x (1 + 2 + ... +j) 
= Mk + 3)2 +j(k + 1)(2k +j + 5)1/2. 
Next, the number of linear orders in B with z above y is easily seen to be 
S(z,~)=(k+j+h+3)(2+3+...+(k+l)) 
= W + Nk +j + h + W. 
Finally, the number of linear extensions of P with x over z is, according 
to the placement of z, then x above z, 
S(x, z) = Q)(3) + (3)(4) + *.. + (k +j + I)@ +j + 2) 
= (k + j + l)(k + j + 2)(k + j + 3)/3 - 2. 
Now with (k, j, h) = (13,6,8) and I XI = k + j + h + 4 = 31, we 
have 
I B 1 = 6270 
S(x, y) = 3218 
S(y,z) = 191 -S(z,y) =3150 
S(z,x) = 191 -S(x.z) = 3192. 
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Since ] B l/2 = 3135, this gives x >P y, y >P z, and z >P x for the 
desired cycle. The “majorities” in this case are rather narrow with 
S(x, y)/l B 1 = .5132, S(y, z)/l P / = 5024, and S(z, x)/l B I = .5091. 
When (k, j, h) = (2j + 1, j, j + 2), it is easily checked that the xyzx 
cycle obtains if and only if j 3 6. The preceding paragraph uses the 
smallest j in this format which produces the cycle. [As j increases, 
S(y, z)/l B I approaches 5/9 from below, and each of S(x, y)/l B I and 
S(z, x)/l B 1 approaches l/2 from above.] It can also be shown that a cycle 
cannot result for Fig. 1 when k < 2j + 1 and that any cycle with 
k > 2j + 1 must have I X I > 31. Hence under the general pattern for P 
given in Fig. 1, the smallest Xwhich can yield a cycle has 31 points. It may 
also be noted that if point t is deleted from Fig. 1, then, regardless of the 
values of k, j, and h, >P will include no cycle. 
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